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Language processing is not an isolated capacity, but is embedded in other aspects of 
our cognition. However, it is still largely unexplored to what extent and how language 
processing interacts with general cognitive resources. This question can be investigated 
with cognitively constrained computational models, which simulate the cognitive pro-
cesses involved in language processing. The theoretical claims implemented in cognitive 
models interact with general architectural constraints such as memory limitations. This 
way, it generates new predictions that can be tested in experiments, thus generating 
new data that can give rise to new theoretical insights. This theory-model-experiment 
cycle is a promising method for investigating aspects of language processing that 
are difficult to investigate with more traditional experimental techniques. This review 
specifically examines the language processing models of Lewis and Vasishth (2005), 
Reitter et al. (2011), and Van Rij et al. (2010), all implemented in the cognitive archi-
tecture Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational (Anderson et al., 2004). These models 
are all limited by the assumptions about cognitive capacities provided by the cognitive 
architecture, but use different linguistic approaches. Because of this, their comparison 
provides insight into the extent to which assumptions about general cognitive resources 
influence concretely implemented models of linguistic competence. For example, the 
sheer speed and accuracy of human language processing is a current challenge in the 
field of cognitive modeling, as it does not seem to adhere to the same memory and 
processing capacities that have been found in other cognitive processes. Architecture-
based cognitive models of language processing may be able to make explicit which 
language-specific resources are needed to acquire and process natural language. 
The review sheds light on cognitively constrained models of language processing from 
two angles: we discuss (1) whether currently adopted cognitive assumptions meet the 
requirements for language processing, and (2) how validated cognitive architectures 
can constrain linguistically motivated models, which, all other things being equal, will 
increase the cognitive plausibility of these models. Overall, the evaluation of cognitively 
constrained models of language processing will allow for a better understanding of the 
relation between data, linguistic theory, cognitive assumptions, and explanation.
Keywords: language processing, sentence processing, linguistic theory, cognitive modeling, Adaptive Control of 
Thought—Rational, cognitive resources, computational simulations
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iNTRODUCTiON
Language is one of the most remarkable capacities of the 
human mind. Arguably, language is not an isolated capacity of 
the mind but is embedded in other aspects of cognition. This 
can be seen in, for example, linguistic recursion. Although 
linguistic recursion (e.g., “the sister of the father of the cousin 
of…”) could in principle be applied infinitely many times, if 
the construction becomes too complex we will lose track of its 
meaning due to memory constraints (Gibson, 2000; Fedorenko 
et al., 2013). Even though there are ample examples of cognitive 
resources like memory playing a role in language processing 
(e.g., King and Just, 1991; Christiansen and Chater, 2016; Huettig 
and Janse, 2016), it is still largely unexplored to what extent 
language processing and general cognitive resources interact. 
That is, which general cognitive resources and which language 
processing-specific resources are used for language processing? 
For example, is language processing supported by the same 
memory system that is used in other cognitive processes? In 
this review, we will investigate to what extent general cognitive 
resources limit and influence models of linguistic competence. 
To this end, we will review cognitively constrained compu-
tational models of language processing implemented in the 
cognitive architecture Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational 
(ACT-R) and evaluate how general cognitive limitations influ-
ence linguistic processing in these models. These computational 
cognitive models explicitly implement theoretical claims, for 
example about language, based on empirical observations or 
experimental data. The evaluation of these models will generate 
new insights about the interplay between language and other 
aspects of cognition.
Memory is one of the most important general cognitive 
principles for language processing. In sentence processing, words 
have to be processed rapidly, because otherwise the memory of 
the preceding context, necessary for understanding the complete 
sentence, will be lost (Christiansen and Chater, 2016). Evidence 
that language processing shares a memory system with other 
cognitive processes can be found in the relation between general 
working memory tests and linguistic tests. For example, individual 
differences in working memory capacity have been found to play 
a role in syntactic processing (King and Just, 1991), predictive 
language processing (Huettig and Janse, 2016), and discourse 
production (Kuijper et al., 2015). Besides memory, other factors 
like attentional focus (Lewis et al., 2006) and processing speed 
(Hendriks et al., 2007) have been argued to influence linguistic 
performance. Thus, it seems apparent that language processing is 
not an isolated capacity but is embedded in other aspects of cog-
nition. This claim conflicts with the traditional view that language 
is a specialized faculty (cf. Chomsky, 1980; Fodor, 1983). It is 
therefore important to note that computational cognitive models 
can be used to investigate both viewpoints, i.e., to investigate to 
what extent general cognitive resources can be used in language 
processing but also to investigate to what extent language is a spe-
cialized process. It has also been argued that language processing 
is a specialized process that is nevertheless influenced by a range 
of general cognitive resources (cf. Newell, 1990; Lewis, 1996). 
Therefore, we argue that the potential influence and limitations 
of general cognitive resources should be taken into account when 
studying theories of language processing.
To be able to account for the processing limitations imposed 
by a scarcity of cognitive resources, theories of language need to 
be specified as explicitly as possible with regards to, for example, 
processing steps, the incrementality of processing, memory 
retrievals, and representations. This allows for a specification 
of what belongs to linguistic competence and what belongs to 
linguistic performance (Chomsky, 1965): competence is the 
knowledge a language user has, whereas performance is the 
output that a language user produces, which results from his 
competence in combination with other (cognitive) factors (see 
Figure  1 for examples). Many linguistic theories have been 
argued to be theories of linguistic competence that abstract away 
from details of linguistic performance (Fromkin, 2000). These 
theories rarely make explicit how the step from competence to 
performance is made. In order to create a distinction between 
competence and performance, an increasing emphasis is placed 
on grounding linguistic theories empirically by creating the step 
from an abstract theory to concrete, testable predictions (cf. e.g., 
Kempen and Hoenkamp, 1987; Roelofs, 1992; Baayen et al., 1997; 
Reitter et  al., 2011). Formalizing language processing theories 
explicitly thus means that the distinction between linguistic com-
petence and linguistic performance can be explained and makes 
it possible to examine which cognitive resources, according to a 
language processing theory, are needed to process language (see 
also Hale, 2011).
The importance of explicitly specified linguistic theories that 
distinguish between competence and performance can be seen 
in the acquisition of verbs. Children show a U-shaped learning 
curve (see Pauls et  al., 2013 for an overview, U-shaped learn-
ing curve is depicted in Figure 1) when learning past tenses of 
verbs, using the correct irregular form first (e.g., the past tense 
ate for eat), then using the incorrect regular form of irregular 
verbs (e.g., eated), before using the correct irregular form again. 
It is conceivable that whereas children’s performance initially 
decreases, children are in the process of learning how to cor-
rectly form irregular past tenses and therefore have increasing 
competence (cf. Taatgen and Anderson, 2002). In this example, 
explicitly specifying the processing that is needed to form verb 
tenses and how this processing uses general cognitive resources 
could explain why children’s performance does not match their 
competence. Another example of performance deviating from 
competence can be seen in the comprehension and production 
of pronouns: whereas 6-year-old children generally produce pro-
nouns correctly (they have the competence, see Spenader et al., 
2009), they often make mistakes in pronoun interpretation (they 
show reduced performance, Chien and Wexler, 1990).
Especially when different linguistic theories have been put 
forward to explain similar phenomena, it is important to be able 
to compare and test the theories on the basis of concrete predic-
tions. Linguistic theories are often postulated without considering 
cognitive resources. Therefore, it is important to investigate how 
well these theories perform under realistic cognitive constraints; 
this will provide information about their cognitive plausibility. 
Cognitively constrained computational models (from now on: 
cognitive models) are a useful tool to compare linguistic theories 
FigURe 1 | The above graphs show four possible relationships between competence, cognition and performance. Performance is influenced by competence and 
cognition. If someone’s performance (black solid line) increases over age, this could be due to the competence (red dashed line) increasing (as displayed in the 
upper left graph), or due to cognition (shaded area) increasing, while competence stays constant (as displayed in the upper right graph). Cognitive limitations can 
prevent performance from reaching full competence (lower left graph). Competence and cognition can also both change over age and influence performance. The 
lower right graph shows the classical performance curve of U-shaped learning, in which performance initially decreases even though competence is increasing. The 
graphs are a simplification, as factors other than competence and cognition could also influence performance, for example motor skills.
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while taking into account the limitations imposed by a scarcity 
of cognitive resources and can be used to investigate the relation 
between underlying linguistic competence and explicit predic-
tions about performance. Thus, by implementing a linguistic 
theory into a cognitive model, language processing is embedded 
in other aspects of cognition, and the extent can be investigated 
to which assumptions about general cognitive resources influence 
models of linguistic competence.
As cognitive models, we will consider computational models 
simulating human processing that are constrained by realistic and 
validated assumptions about human processing. Such cognitive 
models can generate new predictions that can be tested in further 
experiments, generating new data that can give rise to new imple-
mentations. This theory-model-experiment cycle is a promising 
method for investigating aspects of language processing that are 
difficult to investigate with standard experimental techniques, 
which usually provide insight into performance (e.g., behavior, 
responses, response times), but not competence. Cognitive mod-
els require linguistic theories, that usually describe competence, 
to be explicitly specified. This way, the performance of competing 
linguistic theories, which often have different approaches to the 
structure and interpretation of language, can be investigated using 
cognitive models. Contrary to other computational modeling 
methods, cognitive models simulate the processing of a single 
individual. Because of this, it can be investigated how individual 
variations in cognitive resources (which can be manipulated in a 
model) influence a linguistic theory’s performance.
The comparison of cognitive models that use different 
linguistic approaches is most straightforward when they make 
use of the same assumptions about cognitive resources, and thus 
are implemented in the same cognitive architecture. This review 
will therefore focus on cognitive models developed in the same 
domain-general cognitive architecture, ACT-R (Anderson et al., 
2004). There are several other cognitive architectures available 
(e.g., EPIC: Kieras and Meyer, 1997; NENGO: Stewart et al., 2009), 
but in order to keep the assumptions about general cognitive 
resources roughly constant, this review will only consider models 
implemented in ACT-R. Over the past years, several linguistic 
phenomena have been implemented in ACT-R, such as meta-
phors (Budiu and Anderson, 2002), agrammatism (Stocco and 
Crescentini, 2005), pronominal binding (Hendriks et al., 2007), 
and presupposition resolution (Brasoveanu and Dotlačil, 2015). 
In order to obtain a broad view of cognitively constrained models 
of linguistic theories, we will examine three models of different 
linguistic modalities (comprehension, production, perspective 
taking), that all take a different linguistic approach, in depth: the 
syntactic processing model of Lewis and Vasishth (2005), the 
syntactic priming model of Reitter et al. (2011), and the pronoun 
processing model of Van Rij et al. (2010). By examining models 
of different linguistic modalities that take different linguistic 
approaches, we aim to provide a more unified understanding of 
how language processing is embedded within general cognition, 
and investigate how proficient language use is achieved. The 
selected models are all bounded by the same assumptions about 
cognitive capacities and seriality of processing as provided by 
the cognitive architecture ACT-R, which makes them optimally 
comparable. Their comparison will provide insight into the extent 
to which assumptions about general cognitive resources influence 
models of linguistic competence.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we will discuss the 
components of ACT-R that are most relevant in our discussion 
of language processing models, in order to explain how cognitive 
resources play a role in this architecture. Then, we will outline 
the different linguistic approaches that are used in the models. 
Finally, we will discuss the selected ACT-R models of language 
processing in more detail. Importantly, it will be examined how 
general cognitive resources are used in the models and how these 
cognitive resources and linguistic principles interact.
FigURe 2 | An overview of the standard modules and buffers in Adaptive 
Control of Thought—Rational [based on Anderson et al. (2004)].
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BASiC ACT-R COMPONeNTS
Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational (Anderson, 1993, 2007; 
Anderson et al., 2004) is a cognitive architecture in which models 
can be implemented to simulate a certain process or collection of 
processes. Of specific interest for this review is the simulation of 
language-related processes, such as interpreting or producing a 
sentence. Cognitive models in ACT-R are restricted by general 
cognitive resources and constraints embedded in the ACT-R 
architecture. Examples of such cognitive resources, that are of 
importance when modeling language, are memory, processing 
speed, and attention. By implementing a model of a linguistic 
theory in ACT-R, one can thus examine how this linguistic theory 
behaves in interaction with other aspects of cognition.
Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational aims to explain human 
cognition as the interaction between a set of functional modules. 
Each module has a specific function, such as perception, action, 
memory, and executive function [see Anderson et al. (2004) for 
an overview]. Modules can be accessed by the model through 
buffers. The information in these buffers represents information 
that is in the focus of attention. Only the information that is in 
a buffer can be readily used by the model. An overview of the 
standard ACT-R modules and buffers is shown in Figure 2. The 
modules most relevant for language processing, the declarative 
memory module and the procedural memory module, will be 
discussed in more detail below.
The declarative memory stores factual information as chunks. 
Chunks are pieces of knowledge that can store multiple prop-
erties, such as that there is a cat with the name “Coco,” whose 
color is “gray.” The information in a chunk can only be used 
after the chunk has been retrieved from the declarative memory 
and has been placed in the corresponding retrieval buffer. In 
order to retrieve information from memory, a retrieval request 
must be made. Only chunks with an activation that exceeds a 
predetermined activation threshold can be retrieved. The higher 
the activation of a chunk, the more likely it is to be retrieved. 
The base-level activation of a chunk increases when a chunk 
is retrieved from memory, but decays over time. This way, the 
recency and frequency of a chunk influence a chunk’s activation, 
and thereby its chance of recall and its retrieval time (in line with 
experimental findings, e.g., Deese and Kaufman, 1957; Allen and 
Hulme, 2006). Additionally, information that is currently in the 
focus of attention (i.e., in a buffer) can increase the probability 
that associated chunks are recalled by adding spreading activa-
tion to a chunk’s base-level activation. The activation of chunks 
can additionally be influenced by noise, occasionally causing a 
chunk with less activation to be retrieved over a chunk with more 
activation.
Whereas the declarative memory represents factual knowl-
edge, the procedural memory represents knowledge about how to 
perform actions. The procedural memory consists of production 
rules, which have an if-then structure. An example of the basic 
structure of a production rule is as follows:
IF
a new word is attended
THEN
retrieve lexical information about this word from memory
The THEN-part of a production rule is executed when the 
IF-part matches the current buffer contents. Production rules 
are executed one by one. If the conditions of several production 
rules are met, the one with the highest utility is selected. This 
utility reflects the usefulness the rule has had in the past and can 
be used to learn from feedback, both positively and negatively 
(for more detail on utilities, see Anderson et  al., 2004). New 
production rules can be learned on the basis of existing rules 
and declarative knowledge (production compilation, Taatgen 
and Anderson, 2002).
Several general cognitive resources and further resources that 
are important for language processing are incorporated in the 
ACT-R architecture, such as memory, speed of processing, and 
attention. Long-term memory corresponds to the declarative 
module in ACT-R. Short-term or working memory is not incor-
porated as a separate component in ACT-R (Borst et al., 2010) 
but emanates from the interaction between the buffers and the 
declarative memory. Daily et al. (2001) proposed that the function 
of working memory can be simulated in ACT-R by associating 
relevant information with information that is currently in focus 
(through spreading activation). Thus, working memory capacity 
can change as a result of a change in the amount of spreading 
activation in a model.
Crucially, all above mentioned operations take time. Processing 
in ACT-R is serial, meaning that only one retrieval from declara-
tive memory and only one production rule execution can be 
done at any point in time (this is known as the serial processing 
bottleneck, see Anderson, 2007). The retrieval of information 
from declarative memory is faster and more likely to succeed 
if a chunk has a high activation (for details see Anderson et al., 
2004). Because a chunk’s activation increases when it is retrieved, 
chunks that have been retrieved often will have a high activation 
and will therefore be retrieved more quickly. Production rules in 
5Vogelzang et al. Cognitive Models of Language Processing
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ACT-R take a standard amount of time to fire (50 ms). Rules that 
are often used in succession can merge into a new production 
rule. These new rules are a combination of the old rules that were 
previously fired in sequence, making the model more efficient. 
Thus, increasing activation and production compilation allow 
a model’s processing speed to increase through practice and 
experience.
As described, memory and processing speed are examples of 
general cognitive principles in ACT-R, that will be important 
when implementing models that perform language processing. 
In the next section, three linguistic approaches will be discussed. 
These approaches are relevant for the three cognitive models 
reviewed in the remainder of the paper.
LiNgUiSTiC APPROACHeS
Cognitive models can be used to implement any linguistic 
approach, and as such are not bound to one method or theory. 
In principle any of the theories that have been proposed in 
linguistics to account for a speaker’s linguistic competence, 
such as Combinatorial Categorial Grammar (Steedman, 1988), 
construction grammar (Fillmore et al., 1988), generative syntax 
(Chomsky, 1970), Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar 
(Pollard and Sag, 1994), Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan, 
2001), Optimality Theory (OT) (Prince and Smolensky, 1993), 
Tree-Adjoining Grammar (Joshi et  al., 1975), and usage-based 
grammar (Bybee and Beckner, 2009) could be implemented in a 
cognitive model. Note that this does not imply that any linguistic 
theory or approach can be implemented in any cognitive model, 
as cognitive models place restrictions on what can and cannot be 
modeled. Different linguistic approaches tend to entertain differ-
ent assumptions, for example about what linguistic knowledge 
looks like (universal principles, violable constraints, structured 
lexical categories, grammatical constructions), the relation 
between linguistic forms and their meanings, and the levels of 
representation needed. This then determines whether and how a 
particular linguistic approach can be implemented in a particular 
cognitive model.
In this review, we will discuss three specific linguistic 
approaches that have been implemented in cognitive models, 
which allows us to compare how general cognitive resources 
influence the implementation and output (e.g., responses, 
response times) of these modeled linguistic approaches. The 
three linguistic approaches that will be discussed have several 
features in common but also differ in a number of features: X-bar 
theory (Chomsky, 1970), Combinatorial Categorial Grammar 
(Steedman, 1988), and OT (Prince and Smolensky, 1993). These 
linguistic approaches are implemented in the cognitive models 
discussed in the next section.
Generative syntax uses X-bar theory to build syntactic struc-
tures (Chomsky, 1970). X-bar theory reflects the assumption that 
the syntactic representation of a clause is hierarchical and can be 
presented as a binary branching tree. Phrases are built up around 
a head, which is the principal category. For example, the head of 
a verb phrase is the verb, and the head of a prepositional phrase 
is a preposition. To the left or right of this head, other phrases can 
be attached in the hierarchical structure.
Combinatory Categorial Grammar (CCG) (Steedman, 1988) 
builds the syntactic structure of a sentence in tandem with the 
representation of the meaning of the sentence. It is a strongly lexi-
calized grammar formalism, that proceeds from the assumption 
that the properties of the grammar follow from the properties 
of the words in the sentence. That is, each word has a particular 
lexical category that specifies how that word can combine with 
other words, and what the resulting meaning will be. In addition, 
CCG is surface-driven and reflects the assumption that language 
is processed and interpreted directly, without appealing to an 
underlying—invisible—level of representation. For one sentence, 
CCG can produce multiple representations (Steedman, 1988; 
Reitter et al., 2011). This allows CCG to build syntactic represen-
tations incrementally, from left to right.
The linguistic framework of OT (Prince and Smolensky, 1993) 
reflects the assumption that language is processed based on con-
straints on possible outputs (words, sentences, meanings). Based 
on an input, a set of output candidates is generated. Subsequently, 
these potential outputs are evaluated based on hierarchically 
ranked constraints; stronger constraints have priority over weaker 
constraints. The optimal output is the candidate that satisfies the 
set of constraints best. The optimal output may be a form (in lan-
guage production) or a meaning (in language comprehension).
Commonalities and Differences
X-bar theory, CCG, and OT have different assumptions about 
how language is structured. X-bar theory builds a syntactic 
structure, whereas CCG builds both a syntactic and a semantic 
representation, and OT builds either a syntactic representation (in 
language production) or a semantic representation (in language 
comprehension). Nevertheless, these theories can all be used for 
the implementation of cognitive models of language processing. 
In the next section, three cognitive models of language process-
ing will be discussed in detail, with a focus on how the linguistic 
approaches are implemented and how they interact with other 
aspects of cognition.
COgNiTive MODeLS OF LANgUAge 
PROCeSSiNg
In the following sections, three cognitive language models will be 
described: the sentence processing model of Lewis and Vasishth 
(2005), the syntactic priming model of Reitter et  al. (2011), 
and the pronoun processing model of Van Rij et al. (2010). The 
model of Lewis and Vasishth (2005) uses a parsing strategy that 
is based on X-bar theory, the model of Reitter et al. (2011) uses 
CCG, and the model of Van Rij et al. (2010) uses OT. The models 
will be evaluated based on their predictions of novel empirical 
outcomes and how they achieve these predictions (for example 
how many parameters are fitted, cf. Roberts and Pashler, 2000). 
After describing the models separately, the commonalities and 
differences between these models will be discussed. Based on 
this, we will review how the interaction between general cognitive 
resources in ACT-R and linguistic principles from specific lin-
guistic theories can be fruitful in studying cognitive assumptions 
of linguistic theories.
FigURe 3 | A tree structure generated by left corner parsing of the word the 
from Example (1) by applying rules (c), (b), and (a) consecutively [based on 
Lewis and Vasishth (2005)].
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Modeling Sentence Processing as Skilled 
Memory Retrieval
The first model that we discuss is the sentence processing model 
of Lewis and Vasishth (2005). This model is a seminal model 
forming the basis for many later language processing models 
(a.o., Salvucci and Taatgen, 2008; Engelmann et al., 2013; Jäger 
et al., 2015). Lewis and Vasishth’s (Lewis and Vasishth, 2005) sen-
tenced processing model (henceforth the L&V model) performs 
syntactic parsing based on memory principles: when processing 
a complete sentence, maintaining the part of the sentence that 
is already processed in order to integrate it with new incoming 
information requires (working) memory. The aim of the L&V 
model is to investigate how working memory processes play a 
role in sentence processing.
Theoretical Approach
The L&V model uses left-corner parsing (Aho and Ullman, 
1972), based on X-bar theory (Chomsky, 1970), to build a syn-
tactic representation of the sentence. The left corner (LC) parser 
builds a syntactic structure of the input sentence incrementally, 
and predicts the upcoming syntactic structure as new words are 
encountered. Thus, LC parsing uses information from the words 
in the sentence to predict what the syntactic structure of that 
sentence will be. In doing this, LC parsing combines top-down 
processing, based on syntactic rules, and bottom-up processing, 
based on the words in a sentence. An example sentence is (1).
 (1) The dog ran.
Left corner parsing is based on structural rules, such as those 
given below as (a)–(d). These structural rules for example state 
that a sentence can be made up of a noun phrase (NP) and a verb 
phrase [rule (a)], and that a NP can be made up of a determiner and 
a noun [rule (b)]. An input (word) is nested under the lefthand-
side (generally an overarching category) of a structural rule if that 
rule contains the input on its LC. For example, in sentence (1), the 
is a determiner (Det) according to structural rule (c), which itself 
is on the LC of rule (b) and thus it is nested under an NP. This NP 
is on the LC of rule (a). The result of applying these rules is the 
phrase-structure tree shown in Figure 3.
 (a) S → NP VP
 (b) NP → Det N
 (c) Det → the
 (d) N → dog
Importantly, the generated tree also contains syntactic 
categories that have not been encountered yet (like N and VP in 
Figure 3), so it contains a prediction of the upcoming sentence 
structure. When the next word, dog, is now encountered, it 
can be integrated with the existing tree immediately after applying 
rule (d).
Implementation
The L&V model parses a sentence on the basis of guided memory 
retrievals. Declarative memory is used as the short- and long-
term memory needed for sentence processing. The declarative 
memory holds lexical information as well as any syntactic 
structures that are built during sentence processing. The acti-
vation of these chunks is influenced by the standard ACT-R 
declarative memory functions, and so their activation (and with 
this their retrieval probability and latency) is influenced by the 
recency and frequency with which they were used. Similarity-
based interference occurs because the effectiveness of a retrieval 
request is reduced as the number of items associated with the 
specific request increases.
Grammatical knowledge however is not stored in the declara-
tive memory but is implemented as procedural knowledge in 
production rules. That is, the knowledge about how sentences 
are parsed is stored in a large number of production rules, which 
interact with the declarative memory when retrieving lexical 
information or constituents (syntactic structures).
The L&V model processes a sentence word for word using the 
LC parsing algorithm described in Section “Theoretical Approach.” 
An overview of the model’s processing steps is shown in Figure 4. 
After a word is attended [for example, the from Example (1), 
Box 1], lexical information about this word is retrieved from 
memory and stored in the lexical buffer (Box 2). Based on the 
syntactic category of the word and the current state of the model, 
the model looks for a prior constituent that the new syntactic 
category could be attached to (Box 3). In our example, the is a 
determiner and it is the first word, so a syntactic structure with 
a determiner will be retrieved. The model then creates a new 
syntactic structure by attaching the new word to the retrieved 
constituent (Box 4). A new word is then attended [dog in Example 
(1), Box 1]. This cycle continues until no new words are left to 
attend.
Evaluation
Lewis and Vasishth (2005) presented several simulation studies, 
showing that their model can account for reading times from 
experiments. The model also accounts for the effects of the length 
of a sentence (short sentences are read faster than long sentences) 
and structural interference (high interference creates a bigger 
delay in reading times than low interference) on unambiguous 
and garden-path sentences. With a number of additions (that are 
outside the scope of this review), the model can be made to cope 
FigURe 4 | Overview of the processing steps of L&V’s sentence processing model [based on Lewis and Vasishth (2005)]. The model processes one word at a time 
when processing a sentence such as Example (1), first retrieving its lexical information and then retrieving a prior constituent for the new word to be attached to.
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with gapped structures and embedded structures, as well as local 
ambiguity (see Lewis and Vasishth, 2005, for more detail).
Predictions
Lewis and Vasishth (2005) compared their output to existing 
experiments, rather than making explicit predictions about new 
experiments. The model does however provide ideas about why 
any discrepancies between the model and the fitted data occur, 
which could be seen as predictions, although these predictions 
have not been tested in new experiments. For example, in a 
simulation comparing the L&V models’ simulated reading times 
of subject relative clauses vs. object relative clauses to data from 
Grodner and Gibson (2005), the model overestimates the cost 
of object-gap filling for object relative clauses. The prediction 
following from the model is that adjusting the latency, a standard 
ACT-R parameter that influences the time it takes to perform a 
chunk retrieval, would reduce the difference between model and 
data. Thus, the prediction is that the retrieval latency of chunks 
may be lower in this type of language processing than in other 
cognitive processes.
Linguistic Principles
X-bar theory is a widely known approach to syntactic structure. 
Although already previously implemented as an LC parser (Aho 
and Ullman, 1972), it is interesting to examine this linguistic 
approach in interaction with memory functions. Importantly, 
the use of LC parsing allowed the L&V model to use a top-
down (prediction-based, cf. Chesi, 2015) as well as bottom-up 
(input-based, cf. Chomsky, 1993) processing, which increases its 
efficiency.
Cognitive Principles
Many of the cognitive principles used in the L&V model are taken 
directly from ACT-R: memory retrievals are done from declara-
tive memory, the grammatical knowledge needed for parsing is 
incorporated in production rules, and sentences are processed 
serially (word by word). Memory plays a very important role 
in the model, as processing sentences requires memory of the 
recent past. For all memory functions, the same principles of 
declarative memory are used as would be used for non-linguistic 
processes. For the L&V model, the standard ACT-R architecture 
was expanded with a lexical buffer, which holds a lexical chunk 
after it is retrieved from the declarative memory. Thus, the model 
assumes the use of general memory functions for language 
processing, but added a specific attention component to store 
linguistic (lexical) information that is in the focus of attention.
The speed of processing required for language processing is 
achieved in the L&V model by keeping the model’s processing 
down to the most efficient way to do things: the processing of a 
word takes a maximum of three production rules and two memory 
retrievals, serially. This however includes only the syntactic pro-
cessing, and not, for example, any semantic processing. It remains 
to be investigated therefore how the model would function if 
more language processing elements, that take additional time to 
be executed due to the serial processing bottleneck, are added.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the simulations show a decent fit when compared to 
data from several empirical experiments, there are a number of 
phenomena for which a discrepancy is found between the simu-
lation data and some of the experimental data. Specifically, the 
L&V model overestimates effects of the length of a sentence and 
underestimates interference effects. Lewis and Vasishth (2005) 
indicated that part of this discrepancy may be resolved by giv-
ing more weight to decay and less weight to interference in the 
model, but leave the mechanisms responsible for length effects 
and interference effects open for future research.
Lewis and Vasishth (2005) acknowledged that the model is 
a first step to modeling complete sentence comprehension and 
indicated that future extensions might lie in the fields of semantic 
and discourse processing, the interaction between lexical and 
syntactic processing, and investigating individual performance 
based on working memory capacity differences. Indeed, this 
sentence processing model is an influential model that has served 
as a building block for further research. For example, Engelmann 
et  al. (2013) used the sentence processing model to study the 
relation between syntactic processing and eye movements, 
Salvucci and Taatgen (2008) used the model in their research of 
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multitasking, and Van Rij et al. (2010) and Vogelzang (2017) build 
their OT model of pronoun resolution on top of L&V’s syntactic 
processing model.
Modeling Syntactic Priming in Language 
Production
A second model discussed in this paper is the ACT-R model of 
Reitter et al. (2011). Their model (henceforth the RK&M model) 
investigates syntactic priming in language production. Speakers 
have a choice between different words and grammatical structures 
to express their ideas. They tend to repeat previously encountered 
grammatical structures, a pattern of linguistic behavior that is 
referred to as syntactic or structural priming (for a review, see 
Pickering and Ferreira, 2008). For example, Bock (1986) found 
that when speakers were presented with a passive construc-
tion such as The boy was kissed by the girl as a description of a 
picture, they were more likely to describe a new picture using a 
similar syntactic structure. Effects of priming have been detected 
with a range of syntactic constructions, including NP variants 
(Cleland and Pickering, 2003), the order of main and auxiliary 
verbs (Hartsuiker and Westenberg, 2000), and other structures, 
in a variety of languages (Pickering and Ferreira, 2008), and in 
children (Huttenlocher et  al., 2004; Van Beijsterveldt and Van 
Hell, 2009), but also syntactic phrase-structure rules in general 
(Reitter et al., 2006; Reitter and Moore, 2014).
In the literature, a number of factors that interact with priming 
have been identified:
•	 Cumulativity: priming strengthens with each copy of the 
primed construction (Jaeger and Snider, 2008).
•	 Decay: the probability of occurrence of a syntactic construc-
tion decays over time (Branigan et al., 1999).
•	 Lexical boost: lexically similar materials increase the chance 
that priming will occur (Pickering and Branigan, 1998).
•	 Inverse frequency interaction: priming by less frequent con-
structions is stronger (Scheepers, 2003).
Besides these factors, differences have been found between 
fast, short-term priming and slow, long-term adaptation, which 
is a learning effect that can persist over several days (Bock et al., 
2007; Kaschak et al., 2011b). These two different priming effects 
have been suggested to use separate underlying mechanisms 
(Hartsuiker et al., 2008), and as such may rely on different cogni-
tive resources.
Syntactic priming is seen as an important effect by which to 
validate models of syntactic representations and associated learn-
ing. Several other models of syntactic priming were proposed 
(Chang et al., 2006; Snider, 2008; Malhotra, 2009), but none of 
these are able to account for all mentioned factors as well as short 
and long term priming. The goal of the RK&M model is thus 
to account for all types of syntactic priming within a cognitive 
architecture.
Theoretical Approach
The RK&M model is based on a theoretical approach that 
explains priming as facilitation of lexical-syntactic access. The 
model bases its syntactic composition process on a broad-cov-
erage grammar framework, CCG (see Linguistic Approaches, 
Steedman, 1988, 2000). Categorial Grammars use a small set of 
combinatory rules and a set of parameters to define the basic 
operations that yield sentences in a specific language. Most 
specific information is stored in the lexicon. With the use of 
CCG, the RK&M model implements the idea of combinato-
rial categories as in Pickering and Branigan’s (Pickering and 
Branigan, 1998) model.
In CCG, the syntactic process is the result of combinations 
of adjacent words and phrases (in constituents). Unlike classical 
phrase-structure trees, however, the categories that classify each 
constituent reflect its syntactic and semantic status by stating 
what other components are needed before a sentence results. For 
example, the phrase loves toys needs to be combined with a NP to 
its left, as in Example 2. This phrase is assigned the category S\ NP. 
Similarly, the phrase Dogs love requires a NP to its right to be 
complete, thus, its category is S//NP. Many analyses (derivations) 
of a given sentence are possible in CCG.
 (2) Dogs love toys.
Combinatory Categorial Grammar allows the RK&M model 
to generate a syntactic construction incrementally, so that a 
speaker can start speaking before the entire sentence is planned. 
However, it also allows the planning of a full sentence before a 
speaker starts speaking. CCG is generally underspecified and 
generates more sentences than would be judged acceptable. The 
RK&M model at least partially addresses this over-generation by 
employing memory-based ACT-R mechanisms, which also help 
in providing a cognitively plausible version of a language model.
Implementation
In the RK&M model, lexical forms and syntactic categories are 
stored in chunks in declarative memory. The activation of any 
chunk in ACT-R is determined by previous occurrences, which 
causes previously used, highly active chunks to have a higher 
retrieval probability, creating a priming effect.
The RK&M model additionally uses spreading activation 
to activate all syntax chunks that are associated with a lexical 
form, creating the possibility to express a meaning in multiple 
ways. Some ways of expressing a meaning are more frequent in 
language than others, and therefore the amount of spreading 
activation from a lexical form to a syntax chunk is mediated by 
the frequency of the syntactic construction. This causes more 
frequent forms to have a higher activation and therefore to be 
more likely to be selected. However, a speaker’s choice of syntactic 
construction can vary on the basis of priming and noise.
To make its theoretical commitments to cue-based, fre-
quency- and recency-governed declarative retrieval, as well as its 
non-commitments to specific production rules and their timing 
more clear, the RK&M model was implemented first in ACT-R 6, 
and then in the ACT-UP implementation of the ACT-R theory 
(Reitter and Lebiere, 2010).
Syntactic Realization
The RK&M model takes a semantic description of a sentence as 
input and creates a syntactic structure for this input. The serially 
executed processing steps of the model are shown in Figure 5 and 
will be explained on the basis of Example (3).
FigURe 5 | Overview of the processing steps of RK&M’s syntactic priming model, which produces the syntactic structure of a sentence such as Example (3) [based 
on Reitter et al. (2011)]. First, retrievals of the lexical form of the head and a thematic role are done. Then, the model selects an argument for the thematic role and 
retrieves a syntax chunk before combining the information according to combinatorial rules of Combinatory Categorial Grammar in the adjoin phase.
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 (3) Sharks bite.
First, the model retrieves a lexical form for the head of the 
sentence (Box 1). In Example (3), this head will be the verb bite. 
Then the most active thematic role is retrieved from memory 
(Box 2), which would be the “agent-role” in our example. If no 
next thematic role can be retrieved, the entire sentence has been 
generated and an output can be given. The model then identifies 
the argument associated with the retrieved thematic role and 
retrieves a lexical form for this argument (Box 3). In the case 
of the agent-role in Example (3), this will be sharks. Following, 
the model retrieves a syntax chunk that is associated with the 
retrieved lexical form (Box 4). The lexical form was sharks, and 
the corresponding syntax chunk will thus indicate that this is 
an NP, and that it needs a verb to its right (S/VP). Finally, the 
model adjoins the new piece of syntactic information with the 
syntactic structure of the phrase thus far (Box 5), according to 
the combinatorial rules of CCG. The model then goes back to 
retrieving the next thematic role (Box 2) and repeats this process 
until the entire sentence has been generated.
Priming
Within the language production process, syntactic choice points 
(Figure  5, Box 4) will occur, during which a speaker decides 
between several possible syntactic variants. The model needs to 
explicate the probability distribution over possible decisions at 
that point. This can be influenced by priming.
The time course of priming is of concern in the RK&M model. 
Immediately after a prime, repetition probability is strongly 
elevated. The model uses two default ACT-R mechanisms, 
base-level learning and spreading activation, to account for long-
term adaptation and short-term priming. Short-term priming 
emerges from a combination of two general memory effects: (1) 
rapid temporal decay of syntactic information and (2) cue-based 
memory retrieval subject to interfering and facilitating semantic 
information (Reitter et al., 2011). Long-term priming effects in 
the model emerge from the increase in base-level activation that 
occurs when a chunk is retrieved.
Evaluation
In the RK&M model, base-level learning and spreading activa-
tion account for long-term adaptation and short-term priming, 
respectively. By simulating a restricted form of incremental lan-
guage production, it accounts for (a) the inverse frequency inter-
action (Scheepers, 2003; Reitter, 2008; Jaeger and Snider, 2013); 
(b) the absence of a decay in long-term priming (Hartsuiker and 
Kolk, 1998; Bock and Griffin, 2000; Branigan et al., 2000; Bock 
et  al., 2007); and (c) the cumulativity of long-term adaptation 
(Jaeger and Snider, 2008). The RK&M model also explains the 
lexical boost effect and the fact that it only applies to short-term 
priming, because semantic information is held in short-term 
memory and serves as a source of activation for associated syn-
tactic material.
The model uses lexical-syntactic associations as in the 
residual- activation account (Pickering and Branigan, 1998). 
However, learning remains an implicit process, and routinization 
(acquisition of highly trained sequences of actions) may still 
occur, as it would in implicit learning accounts.
The RK&M model accounts for a range of priming effects, but 
despite providing an account of grammatical encoding, it has not 
been implemented to explain how speakers construct complex 
sentences using the broad range of syntactic constructions found 
in a corpus.
Predictions
Because semantic information is held in short-term memory and 
serves as a source of activation for associated syntactic material, 
the RK&M model predicts that lexical boost occurs with the rep-
etition of any lexical material with semantic content, rather than 
just with repeated head words. This prediction was confirmed 
with corpus data (Reitter et  al., 2011) and also experimentally 
(Scheepers et al., 2017). The RK&M model also predicts that only 
content words cause a lexical boost effect. This prediction was not 
tested on the corpus, although it is compatible with prior experi-
mental results using content words (Corley and Scheepers, 2002; 
Schoonbaert et al., 2007; Kootstra et al., 2012) and semantically 
related words (Cleland and Pickering, 2003), and the insensitiv-
ity of priming to closed-class words (Bock and Kroch, 1989; 
Pickering and Branigan, 1998; Ferreira, 2003).
The model predicted cumulativity of prepositional-object 
construction priming, and it suggested that double-object con-
structions are ineffective as primes to the point where cumula-
tivity cannot be detected. In an experimental study published 
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later by another lab (Kaschak et al., 2011a), this turned out to 
be the case.
Linguistic Principles
An important aspect of the RK&M model is that it uses CCG. 
This allows the model to realize syntactic constructions both 
incrementally and non-incrementally, without storing large 
amounts of information. CCG can produce multiple representa-
tions of the input at the same time, which reflect the choices that 
a speaker can make. CCG has enjoyed substantial use on large-
scale problems in computational linguistics in recent years. Still, 
how much does this theoretical commitment (of CCG) limit the 
model’s applicability? The RK&M model relies, for its account of 
grammatical encoding, on the principles of incremental planning 
made possible by categorial grammars. However, for its account 
of syntactic priming, the deciding principle is that the grammar is 
lexicalized, and that syntactic decisions involve lower-frequency 
constructions that are retrieved from declarative (lexical) 
memory. Of course, ACT-R as a cognitive framework imposes 
demands on what the grammatical encoder can and cannot do, 
chiefly in terms of working memory: large, complex symbolic 
representations such as those necessary to process subtrees in 
Tree-Adjoining Grammar (Joshi et  al., 1975), or large feature 
structures of unification-based formalisms such as Head-driven 
Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard and Sag, 1994) would be 
implausible under the assumptions of ACT-R.
Cognitive Principles
The RK&M model’s linguistic principles are intertwined with cog-
nitive principles in order to explain priming effects. Declarative 
memory retrievals and the accompanying activation boost cause 
frequently used constructions to be preferred. Additionally, the 
model uses the default ACT-R component of spreading activation 
to give additional activation to certain syntax chunks, increasing 
the likelihood that a specific syntactic structure will be used. 
Working memory capacity is not specified in the RK&M model.
The RK&M model is silent with respect to the implementation 
of its grammatical encoding algorithms. Standard ACT-R pro-
vides for production rules that represent routinized skills. These 
rules are executed at a rate of one every 50 ms. Whether that is fast 
enough for grammatical encoding when assuming a serial pro-
cessing bottleneck, and how production compilation can account 
for fast processing, is unclear at this time. Production compila-
tion, in ACT-R, can combine a sequence of rule invocations and 
declarative retrievals into a single, large and efficient production 
rule. An alternative explanation may be that the production rule 
system associated with the syntactic process is not implemented 
by the basal ganglia, the brain structure normally associated with 
ACT-R’s production rules, but by a language-specific region such 
as Broca’s area. This language-specific region may allow for faster 
processing.
Limitations and Future Directions
Some effects related to syntactic priming remain unexplained by 
the RK&M model. For example, the repetition of thematic and 
semantic assignments between sentences (Chang et  al., 2003) 
is not a consequence of retrieval of lexical-syntactic material. A 
future ACT-R model can make use of working memory accounts 
(cf. Van Rij et al., 2013) to explain repetition preferences leading 
to such effects.
Modeling the Acquisition of Object 
Pronouns
The third and final model that is discussed, is Van Rij et al.’s (2010) 
model for the acquisition of the interpretation of object pronouns 
(henceforth the RR&H model). In languages such as English and 
Dutch, an object pronoun (him in Example 4) cannot refer to 
the local subject (the penguin in Example 4, cf. e.g., Chomsky, 
1981). Instead, it must refer to another referent in the context, in 
our example the sheep. In contrast, reflexives such as “zichzelf ” 
(himself, herself) can only refer to the local subject.
 (4) Look, a penguin and a sheep. The penguin is hitting him/
himself.
Children up to age seven allow the unacceptable interpretation 
of the object pronoun “him” (the penguin), although children 
perform adult-like on the interpretation of reflexives from the 
age of four (e.g., Chien and Wexler, 1990; Philip and Coopmans, 
1996). Interestingly, children as early as 4 years old show adult-
like production of object pronouns and reflexives (e.g., De Villiers 
et al., 2006; Spenader et al., 2009). The ACT-R model is used to 
investigate why children show difficulties interpreting object 
pronouns, but not interpreting reflexives or producing object 
pronouns or reflexives.
Theoretical Account
To explain the described findings on the interpretation of object 
pronouns and reflexives, Hendriks and Spenader (2006) proposed 
that children do not lack the linguistic knowledge needed for object 
pronoun interpretation but fail to take into account the speaker’s 
perspective. According to this account, formulated within OT 
(Prince and Smolensky, 1993, see Linguistic Approaches), object 
pronouns compete with reflexives in their use and interpretation.
In the account of Hendriks and Spenader (2006), two gram-
matical constraints guide the production and interpretation of 
pronouns and reflexives. “Principle A” is the strongest constraint, 
which states that reflexives have the same reference as the subject 
of the clause. In production, Hendriks and Spenader assume a 
general preference for producing reflexives over pronouns, which 
is formulated in the constraint “Avoid Pronouns.”
Hendriks and Spenader (2006) argue that the interpretation 
of object pronouns is not ambiguous for adults, because they 
take into account the speakers’ perspective: if the speaker wanted 
to refer to the subject (e.g., the penguin in Example 4), then the 
speaker would have used a reflexive in accordance with the 
constraint Principle A. When the speaker did not use a reflexive, 
therefore, an adult listener should be able to conclude that the 
speaker must have wanted to refer to another referent. Although 
this account can explain the asymmetry in children’s production 
and interpretation of object pronouns, it does not provide a theory 
on how children acquire the interpretation of object pronouns. To 
investigate this question, the theoretical account of Hendriks and 
Spenader was implemented in ACT-R (Van Rij et al., 2010; see 
also Hendriks et al., 2007).
FigURe 6 | The optimization process as implemented in the RR&H model to determine the optimal meaning for a form such as him in Example (4) (in 
comprehension), and the optimal form for a meaning such as co-reference [(in production), based on Van Rij et al. (2010)].
FigURe 7 | An optimization process from the perspective of the listener as well as an optimization process from the perspective of the speaker is performed [based 
on Van Rij et al. (2010)].
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Implementation
An overview of the RR&H model is presented in Figure 6. The 
process of finding the optimal meaning for a form (in comprehen-
sion) or finding the optimal form for a meaning (in production) 
was implemented in ACT-R as a serial process. To illustrate the 
process, consider the interpretation of the pronoun him.
Using Grammatical Constraints
When interpreting a pronoun, two consecutive production rules 
request the retrieval of two candidate interpretations from the 
model’s declarative memory (Box 1 and Box 2 in Figure 6). The 
two candidate interpretations are the co-referential interpretation 
(i.e., reference to the referent expressed by the local subject, e.g., 
the penguin in Example 4) and the disjoint interpretation (i.e., 
reference to another referent in the discourse, such as the sheep 
in Example 4). Consequently, a production rule requests the 
retrieval of a grammatical constraint from declarative memory. 
The chunk that represents the constraint Principle A has the high-
est activation because it is the strongest constraint and is retrieved 
from memory first (see Box 3).
On the basis of the retrieved constraint, the two candidate 
interpretations are evaluated (Box 4 and 5). If one of the candi-
dates violates the constraint, the RR&H model tries to replace that 
candidate by a new candidate (Box 4 and Box 2). If it cannot find 
a new candidate in memory, the remaining candidate is selected 
as the optimal interpretation.
If the input was a pronoun, however, none of the candidate 
interpretations violates Principle A. Therefore, both candidate 
interpretations are still possible (Box 5). In this situation, the 
RR&H model retrieves a new constraint (Box 3), Avoid Pronouns. 
This constraint cannot distinguish between the two candidate 
meanings either, because it only applies to forms. As both the 
co-referential and the disjoint interpretation are still possible, the 
model randomly selects one of the two candidates as the optimal 
interpretation. The random choice between two optimal candi-
dates reflects children’s behavior in the interpretation of object 
pronouns.
Perspective Taking
After selecting the optimal interpretation, the RR&H model takes 
the speaker’s perspective to verify whether the speaker indeed 
intended to express the selected interpretation (see Figure  7). 
Taking the speaker’s perspective, the model uses the same opti-
mization mechanism, but now the input is the meaning (optimal 
interpretation) selected in the previous step when taking the 
listener’s perspective (m1), and the output is the optimal form to 
express that meaning (f2).
Continuing with the example of processing an object pronoun, 
the model could have selected the co-referential interpretation 
as the interpretation of the object pronoun when taking the lis-
tener’s perspective. In that situation, the input (m1) for the second 
optimization step, using the speaker’s perspective, would be the 
co-referential interpretation. The output of the second optimiza-
tion step (f2) is the reflexive form, because the constraint Avoid 
Pronouns favors the use of a reflexive over a pronoun.
After the two optimization steps, a new production rule fires 
that compares the initial input (the object pronoun) with the out-
put (a reflexive, Figure 7 Box 3). As these forms are not identical 
12
Vogelzang et al. Cognitive Models of Language Processing
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org September 2017 | Volume 2 | Article 11
in our example, the model concludes that a co-referential inter-
pretation is not intended by the speaker: the speaker would have 
used a reflexive rather than a pronoun to express a co-referential 
interpretation. As a consequence, the model will take an alterna-
tive candidate interpretation, the disjoint interpretation, and will 
check if the speaker could have intended a disjoint interpretation.
Alternatively, if the model had selected a disjoint interpretation 
for a pronoun during the first optimization step, the input for the 
speaker’s perspective (m1) would be a disjoint interpretation. The 
constraint Principle A would cause the model to select a pronoun 
rather than a reflexive for expressing the disjoint interpretation 
(f2). As the original input (f1, a pronoun) and the output (f2, also 
a pronoun) are identical, the model concludes that the speaker 
indeed intended a disjoint interpretation.
Although children are expected to use the same perspective 
taking mechanism as adults, it is assumed that children’s process-
ing is initially too slow to complete this process. The time for 
pronoun resolution is limited: When the next word comes, the 
model stops processing the pronoun and redirects its attention to 
the new word. Gradually however, children’s processing becomes 
more efficient due to ACT-R’s default mechanism of production 
compilation (Taatgen and Anderson, 2002). This way, the process 
becomes more efficient, and over time it is possible to take the 
perspective of the speaker into account in interpretation.
Evaluation
The RR&H model explains the delay in object pronoun acquisi-
tion as arising from the interaction between general cognitive 
principles and specific linguistic constraints. The model simula-
tions show that children’s non-adult-like performance does not 
necessarily arise from differences in linguistic knowledge or dif-
ferences in processing mechanism but may arise because children 
lack processing efficiency.
Predictions
From the RR&H model simulations, a new prediction was 
formulated: when children receive sufficient time for pronoun 
interpretation, they will show more adult-like performance on 
object pronoun interpretation. Van Rij et  al. (2010) tested this 
prediction by slowing down the speech rate. They found that chil-
dren indeed performed significantly more adult-like on object 
pronoun interpretation when they were presented with slowed-
down speech compared to normal speech. A second prediction of 
the RR&H model is that the use of perspective taking in pronoun 
interpretation is dependent on the input frequency of pronouns. 
With higher input frequency, the process becomes more efficient 
in a shorter time (Van Rij et al., 2010; Hendriks, 2014).
Linguistic Principles
The linguistic principles incorporated in the RR&H model is 
rooted in OT. The underlying idea in OT is that an in principle 
infinite set of potential candidates is evaluated on the basis of 
all constraints of the grammar. The serial optimization mecha-
nism implemented in the model is a more constrained version 
of optimization: the two most likely candidates are compared 
using the constraints that are most relevant in the context. In this 
respect, the optimization mechanism could be applied to other 
linguistic (and non-linguistic) phenomena and is thus potentially 
generalizable.
Cognitive Principles
Several general cognitive principles are used in the RR&H model. 
Production compilation learning allowed the model to gradually 
derive an efficient variant of the general cognitive skill of perspec-
tive taking that is specialized for object pronoun interpretation. 
This specialization mechanism has been applied to model other 
linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena (e.g., Taatgen and 
Anderson, 2002). Through the increased efficiency of production 
rules, as well as through increasing activation of candidates and 
constraints that were used for pronoun interpretation, the model’s 
processing speed increases over time.
The RR&H model uses ACT-R’s declarative memory for the 
storage and retrieval of candidates and constraints. However, no 
discourse processing was included in the model, and no working 
memory component was used. Therefore, a remaining ques-
tion is whether, contrary to what is assumed in other research 
(Christiansen and Chater, 2016), processing speed limitations on 
pronoun processing are not imposed by working memory limita-
tions, but by processing efficiently limitations (cf. Kuijper, 2016).
RR&H’s account of the difference between children’s and 
adults’ processing of pronouns crucially follows from the serial 
processing bottleneck assumption, as it assumes that children 
have the knowledge necessary to use bidirectional optimization, 
including all relevant linguistic knowledge, but cannot make use 
of it due to time limitations. Proceduralization is used as the 
explanation for how children arrive at adult performance given 
the serial processing bottleneck.
Limitations and Future Directions
A potential limitation of RR&H’s object pronoun processing 
model is that it is not yet clear how to determine the two most 
likely candidates or how the model can decide what the most rel-
evant constraint is. Another simplification is that both candidate 
referents were introduced in the previous sentence. An interest-
ing extension of the model would be one in which the discourse 
status of the referents would also be taken into account (cf. Van 
Rij et al., 2013). The extended model would need to integrate fac-
tors such as first-mention, frequency, recency, grammatical role 
and role parallelism (Lappin and Leass, 1994), and semantic role 
(Kong et  al., 2009) to account for topicality and the discourse 
prominence of referents (Grosz et  al., 1995), which plays an 
important role in pronoun resolution (Spenader et al., 2009).
Another future direction for this research would be to inves-
tigate why children as early as 4 years old in languages such as 
Italian and Spanish do not allow unacceptable reference to the 
local subject for object pronouns (Italian: McKee, 1992; for an 
overview on Italian see Belletti and Guasti, 2015; Spanish: Baauw, 
2002), in contrast to children in languages such as English and 
Dutch. Thus, this cognitive model could be applied to investigate 
cross-linguistic variation.
Commonalities and Differences
In the previous sections, we discussed three language process-
ing models in ACT-R that were based on different linguistic 
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approaches. The models were all implemented in the same 
cognitive architecture, so they are all constrained by the same 
limitations on cognitive resources. This allows for their compari-
son, which can provide information about how different aspects 
of language processing interact with non-linguistic aspects 
of cognition, and how models addressing different linguistic 
phenomena can be integrated. In this section, we will discuss the 
commonalities and differences between these models in more 
detail, so it can be examined to which extent assumptions about 
general cognitive resources influence implementations of these 
specific linguistic approaches. Additionally, their comparison 
will provide an overview of some choices that can be made 
when implementing a language processing model, such as how 
to represent (grammatical) knowledge, and how these choices 
can directly impact how cognitive resources influence the model. 
The models’ main differences lie in (1) the language modality, 
(2) the linguistic approach they take, and (3) how grammatical 
knowledge is represented.
As for the different language modalities investigated in the 
three models, the model of Lewis and Vasishth (2005) focuses 
on sentence interpretation and builds the syntactic representa-
tions needed for interpretation. In contrast, the model of Reitter 
et al. (2011) focuses on sentence production. The model of Van 
Rij et  al. (2010) again focuses on sentence interpretation but 
includes a sentence production component in its implementation 
of perspective taking. So, the selected models show that cogni-
tive models can perform both sentence processing as needed for 
interpretation and sentence processing as needed for production. 
As the selected models are merely example implementations of 
linguistic approaches, this shows how versatile cognitive mod-
eling can be.
A second difference between the three models is that the mod-
els all take a different linguistic approach, as Lewis and Vasishth 
(2005) used LC parsing based on X-bar theory, Reitter et al. (2011) 
used CCG, and Van Rij et al. (2010) used OT. Although a work-
ing cognitive model does not prove the necessity of a particular 
linguistic approach, it shows its sufficiency: the model of Lewis 
and Vasishth (2005), for example, shows that LC parsing is suf-
ficient to account for experimental data on sentence processing. 
It should be noted that the three linguistic approaches need not 
be mutually exclusive. For example, it is conceivable that a model 
processes sentences based on LC parsing and uses OT to inter-
pret ambiguous pronouns (cf. Van Rij, 2012; Vogelzang, 2017). 
Additionally, it should be noted that all three theories have been 
treated as approaches that have remained unquestioned, whereas 
variations of these approaches may be worth while to consider 
(cf., e.g., Osborne et al., 2011).
A final important difference between the models is how gram-
matical knowledge is represented. In Lewis and Vasishth’s (Lewis 
and Vasishth, 2005) model, lexical information and syntactic 
structures are stored in declarative memory, but grammatical 
rules are incorporated as procedural knowledge in production 
rules. Therefore, their grammatical rules are not subject to the 
activation functions associated with the declarative memory but 
are subject to the time constraints of production rule execution. 
This is different from the model of Reitter et  al. (2011), which 
stores lexical forms as well as syntactic categories as chunks in 
the declarative memory, and therefore also incorporates the 
grammatical rules in the declarative memory. The model of 
Van Rij et al. (2010) incorporates grammatical rules as chunks 
in the declarative memory. So, the models incorporate gram-
matical knowledge in different ways, which has consequences 
for the influence of general cognitive resources on grammatical 
knowledge. Specifically, knowledge stored in declarative memory 
is subject to ACT-R’s principles concerning memory activation 
and retrieval time, whereas knowledge stored in procedural 
memory is subject to ACT-R’s principles concerning production 
rule execution time.
Although the three models differ in several respects, they 
also have a number of important features in common. The most 
important ones that we will discuss are (1) the restrictions placed 
on the model performance by general cognitive resources, (2) the 
assumption of a serial processing bottleneck, and (3) the genera-
tion of quantitative predictions.
As all models were implemented in ACT-R, the performance 
of all models is constrained by the same restrictions on cognitive 
resources. So, although the models focus on different linguistic 
phenomena and use different representations, they all use, for 
example, the same functions of declarative memory for the acti-
vation of chunks. Furthermore, they all use the same distinction 
between procedural and declarative memory and incorporate 
the constraint that information can only be actively used by 
the model once it is retrieved from declarative memory. Using 
the same cognitive architecture therefore makes these different 
models comparable with regard to how the representations are 
influenced by cognitive resources.
Another constraint within all the models, also imposed by 
the cognitive architecture, is the serial processing bottleneck 
(Anderson, 2007). In ACT-R, only one production rule execution 
or memory retrieval can be performed at a time. Using serial pro-
cessing increases the time it takes to perform multiple processing 
steps. Therefore, the serial processing bottleneck creates timing 
constraints for the models, influencing predictions about perfor-
mance. We will discuss the implications of this serial processing 
bottleneck in more detail in the Section “Discussion.”
Finally, the last commonality is that all models can generate 
quantitative predictions. In general, linguistic theories only 
discuss competence and do not address performance and do 
not explain why the observed performance may not match the 
competence. Thus, linguistic theories do not explain, for example, 
why speakers may use a certain form in 80% of the cases, but 
a different form in the other cases. By implementing theoretical 
approaches in cognitive models, quantitative predictions about 
why performance does not match competence can be generated.
DiSCUSSiON
In this review, we investigated to what extent general cognitive 
resources influence concretely implemented models of linguistic 
competence. To this end, we examined the language processing 
models of Lewis and Vasishth (2005), Reitter et al. (2011), and 
Van Rij et al. (2010). In this section, we will discuss the benefits 
and limitations of using a cognitive architecture to implement 
and investigate theories of linguistic competence, and to what 
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extent general cognitive resources influence performance on the 
basis of these theories.
Cognitive architectures provide a framework for implement-
ing theories of linguistic competence in a validated account of 
general cognitive resources related to learning and memory. The 
three specific models that we discussed showed that the cognitive 
architecture ACT-R on the one hand provides sufficient freedom 
to implement different linguistic theories in a plausible manner, 
and on the other hand sufficiently constrains these theories to 
account for several differences between linguistic competence 
and performance. Implementing a linguistic theory in a cognitive 
architecture forces one to specify, among other things, assump-
tions about how lexical, syntactic, and semantic knowledge is 
represented and processed in our mind. These specifications are 
necessarily constrained by general cognitive resources. Therefore, 
general cognitive resources such as memory and processing speed 
also constrain performance on the basis of linguistic theories and 
are crucial for investigating this performance in a cognitively 
plausible framework.
By implementing a theory of linguistic competence in a 
cognitive model, it can be evaluated whether a linguistic theory 
can account for experimental performance data. The distinc-
tion between competence and performance is an advantage of 
cognitive models over abstract linguistic theories (reflecting 
competence) and standard experimental measures (measuring 
performance). A cognitive model thus can not only be used 
to model performance but can also be used to investigate the 
reason why full competence may not be reached (e.g., because of 
memory retrieval limitations: Van Maanen and Van Rijn, 2010, 
processing speed limitations: Van Rij et al., 2010, or the use of 
an incorrect strategy: Arslan et  al., 2017). As such, cognitive 
models can account for patterns of linguistic performance that 
were traditionally accounted for by positing a separate parsing 
module in the mind specifically for language processing (e.g., 
Kimball, 1973; Frazier and Fodor, 1978). This line of argu-
mentation has also been explored by Hale (2011), who argues 
that linguistic theories need to be specified not just on Marr’s 
computational level, but that it is necessary to specify theories at 
a level of detail so that they can be implemented, step-by-step, 
in an algorithmic-level framework and yield precise predictions 
about behavior. The comparison of models described in this 
review makes explicit which assumptions have to be made in 
the cognitive model to incorporate particular linguistic theories. 
All three cognitive models discussed in this review have been 
applied to fit human data. In many of these cases, the model 
could account for the general trends in the data, if not the 
complete data set. As such, all three models provided an explicit 
relation between data, theory, and explanation. Although 
not all models made novel predictions that could be tested in 
new experiments, this is a strength of cognitive modeling and 
therefore something every paper on cognitive modeling should 
include. Adding novel predictions shows that (1) the model was 
not just fitted to existing data and (2) the model is falsifiable. The 
latter is important, because falsifiable models allow a theory to 
be disproven. Providing novel predictions allows other research-
ers to test these, and gather either support for or evidence against 
a specific theory.
An additional benefit of cognitive modeling is that individual 
differences can be investigated. By manipulating, for example, 
the amount of experience (Van Rij et al., 2010), the amount of 
working memory capacity (Van Rij et  al., 2013), or the rate of 
forgetting in memory (Sense et al., 2016), different performance 
levels can be achieved. This way, different individuals can be mod-
eled and it can be investigated why certain mistakes may be made 
(explanations could be, for example limited experience, limited 
memory capacity, limited attention span). By combining different 
simulated individuals, group effects may be explained (Van Rij 
et al., 2010).
There are, however, also some limitations to modeling 
language processing in a cognitive architecture. First, all three 
models that were discussed can account for specific linguistic 
phenomena, but these only form a small part of language. 
Scalability is an issue for many models, as expanding their 
coverage and making them more complex (for example, by 
combining a model that performs full semantic processing 
with a model that performs full syntactic processing) will make 
models slower in any architecture that assumes serial process-
ing. Specifically, although the model of Van Rij et  al. (2010) 
uses the serial processing bottleneck explicitly to account for 
children’s performance errors, both Lewis and Vasishth (2005) 
and Reitter et al. (2011) suggest that their models may strug-
gle with this assumption when expanded. It is thus important 
to keep in mind that the discussed, relatively small, serially 
implemented models of language processing were sufficient to 
fit to experimental data, but the serial processing bottleneck 
may prove to be too strict for sentence processing when a 
complete language processing model is developed. Moreover, 
the discussed models are abstractions and simplifications of 
reality and take into account neither additional internal fac-
tors influencing language processing, such as attentional state 
or focus (Lappin and Leass, 1994; Lewis et al., 2006), emotion 
(Belavkin et  al., 1999), and motivation (Belavkin, 2001), nor 
external factors such as visual context (Tanenhaus et al., 1995). 
Once a model has found support for underlying mechanisms of 
sentence processing, it can be used as a basis for investigating 
the effects of these additional factors. Therefore, the models 
discussed can be seen as a first step toward investigating such 
factors in the future.
A second limitation is related to a concern that Lewis and 
Vasishth (2005) raised: the degrees of freedom in cognitive models. 
For any set of cognitive models to be optimally comparable, they 
should be restricted by the same cognitive resources. However, 
cognitive architectures provide much freedom regarding different 
parameters (for example, the memory decay parameter in ACT-R 
can be changed manually). Therefore, models should generally 
strive to keep the quantitative parameters constant. If this is done, 
any variation between models will originate from the production 
rules and the content of the declarative memory, which is also 
where (linguistic) theory is implemented.
As a final limitation, any cognitive architecture that does not 
specify different types of memory (short-term memory, episodic 
long-term memory, semantic long-term memory) will make it 
difficult to model language processing in all its complexity. For 
example, long-term memory is difficult to implement in ACT-R, 
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because all chunks are subject to the same decay in activation 
over time. Thus, it is a puzzle why people do not forget certain 
pieces of knowledge that are not retrieved frequently (like, for 
example, what a hedgehog is). Recent research has found that 
different types of facts may actually have different decay rates 
(Sense et al., 2016). This can be important for language process-
ing, because even infrequent words are not forgotten and can 
still be recognized and used after a long time. A related issue 
is that cognitive architectures with only one type of memory 
make it challenging to implement and manipulate working 
memory capacity. So, although the possibility of manipulating 
cognitive resources in cognitive models can be seen as a benefit, 
not restricting how these cognitive resources should be mod-
eled limits its application. As language processing is known to 
be constrained by working memory capacity, manipulations of 
working memory capacity would be useful in order to study its 
effects on linguistic performance. Moreover, when modeling 
language acquisition or language attrition, working memory 
may be of great influence, as it can differ between ages (Grivol 
and Hage, 2011) and in clinical populations (e.g., ADHD: 
Martinussen et  al., 2005; autism spectrum disorder: Barendse 
et  al., 2013; cochlear implant users: AuBuchon et  al., 2015). 
Although the function of working memory can be simulated 
indirectly through other processes like spreading activation 
(Daily et al., 2001), restrictions on their implementation in the 
cognitive architecture would make models more comparable 
and potentially more cognitively plausible.
Thus, using a cognitive architecture to investigate theories 
of linguistic competence has clear benefits as well as a number 
of current limitations. The main question in this review was to 
what extent general cognitive resources influence concretely 
implemented models of linguistic competence. An examina-
tion of the different cognitive models of linguistic performance 
provides evidence that well-studied general cognitive resources 
such as working memory influence language processing. In addi-
tion, less well-studied cognitive factors may also play a role, such 
as number of processing steps (Lewis and Vasishth, 2005) and 
processing efficiency (Van Rij et al., 2010). The influence of these 
factors can differ due to differences in, for example, experience, 
processing strategy, or possibly developmental disorder. Thus, 
our investigation of different cognitive models emphasizes that 
not only memory-related resources but also other timing-related 
resources and factors influence language processing.
As stated, implementations of linguistic theories into a cog-
nitive model can, on the one hand, provide information about 
whether the theory can sufficiently account for observed perfor-
mance. On the other hand, they can also be used to investigate 
cognitive processes. For example, the speed of language process-
ing is so high that it may not be met by the time-consuming 
processing steps provided by a cognitive model (cf. Vogelzang, 
2017), or by the same memory processes that underlie other 
cognitive processes. So, from the viewpoint of linguistics, but 
also from the viewpoint of cognitive modeling, the puzzle of 
highly fast and efficient language processing compared to other 
cognitive processes is an interesting direction for future research.
Overall, cognitively constrained models can be used to investi-
gate whether a linguistic theory can account for specific linguistic 
data. The interactions between a particular linguistic approach 
and general cognitive resources can be investigated through 
such models, which formalize of relation between competence 
and performance. Additionally, cognitive models can generate 
quantitative predictions of the basis of theories of linguistic 
competence. Because of this, cognitive models of linguistic 
theories are very suitable for investigating the relation between 
data, theory and experiments. Moreover, the possibility to model 
differences in cognitive resources allows for the investigation of 
individual differences in performance, as well as deviating perfor-
mance due to aging or developmental disorders. In some cases, 
the high efficiency of language processing is currently not met by 
some of the constraining assumptions about cognitive resources. 
In this sense, cognitive models of language processing can also 
be used to investigate human cognition, for example in which 
ways currently adopted cognitive assumptions fail to meet the 
requirements for language processing. In conclusion, investigat-
ing specific linguistic phenomena through cognitive modeling 
can provide new insights that can complement findings from 
standard experimental techniques.
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